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Abstract 
In this study, age-related differences in adults' moral identity were investigated. Moral 
identity was conceptualized a context-dependent self-structure that becomes 
differentiated and (re)integrated in the course of development and that involves a broad 
range of value-orientations. Based on a cross-sectional sample of 252 participants aged 
14 to 65 years (148 women, M = 33.5 years, SD = 16.9) and a modification of the Good 
Self Assessment, it was demonstrated that mean-level of moral identity (averaged across 
the contexts of family, school/work and community) significantly increased in the adult 
years, whereas cross-context differentiation showed a non-linear trend peaking at the age 
of 25 years. Value-orientations that define individuals' moral identity shifted so that self-
direction and rule-conformity became more important with age. Age-related differences 
in moral identity were associated with, but not fully attributable to changes in personality 
traits. Overall, findings suggest that moral identity development is a life-long process that 
starts in adolescence but expands well into middle age. 
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Age-related differences in moral identity across adulthood 
For more than 25 years, the moral identity construct has been discussed as a major 
personality characteristic and an important dimension of individual development (for 
overviews see Hardy & Carlo, 2011a; Walker, 2014). Individuals differ with regard to the 
extent they integrate moral values into their sense of self. Some people feel that being 
honest, compassionate, fair or generous is central for their identity, whereas others 
consider non-moral values such as being active or outgoing as more important. These 
individual differences are attributable to different developmental trajectories, where some 
individuals were able to achieve a higher level of morality-self integration than others. 
Many researchers consider the age period of adolescence and emerging adulthood as 
crucial for moral identity formation (cf. Blasi, 2005; Damon & Hart, 1988; Frimer & 
Walker, 2009; Hardy & Carlo, 2011b). Even though direct empirical evidence supporting 
this view is scarce (for an extensive discussion see Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015), research 
provides indirect support for it. Studies following domain theory (cf. Smetana, Jambon, 
& Ball, 2014) indicate that in multifaceted situations of social exclusion older adolescents 
more often than younger teenagers use moral reasoning rather than conventional 
reasoning (Brenick & Killen, 2014; Horn, 2003). Moreover, studies on the development 
of moral emotions suggest an increase in adolescents' internal moral motivation that 
likely reflects growth in moral identity concerns (Krettenauer, Asendorpf, & Nunner-
Winkler, 2013; Krettenauer, Colasante, Buchmann, & Malti, 2014).  
While moral identity research has been focusing on adolescence and emerging 
adulthood as a critical developmental period, this by no means implies that moral identity 
development is limited to this age period (Lapsley & Stey, 2014; Damon, 1996). In a 
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series of studies, Kochanska and colleagues provided important insights into the 
development of preschoolers' moral self as a precursor of adolescents' moral identity 
(Kochanska, Koenig, Barry, Sanghang, & Yoon, 2010; Kochanska, 2002). Krettenauer, 
Campbell, and Hertz (2013) investigated the development of the moral self in middle 
childhood and provided evidence that children's moral self-concept becomes increasingly 
predictive of moral emotions and social behavior between the ages of 5 and 12 years (see 
also Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015).  
The importance of morality to individuals' sense of self and identity undergoes 
systematic development and becomes increasingly coordinated with other aspects of 
moral functioning, notably moral emotions and moral action. This has been investigated 
numerous times in childhood, adolescence and emerging adulthood. However, it has 
never been studied systematically in the context of adult development. As a consequence, 
it is largely unknown how moral identity develops beyond adolescence and emerging 
adulthood, whether age-related trends continue in the adult years, come to a halt, or are 
reversed, and how moral identity relates to other important dimensions of the adult 
personality. These questions define the focus of the present study. By addressing these 
questions we aim at charting age-related differences in moral identity across adulthood, 
which has been a largely unexplored area of research up to date. However, taking a life 
span perspective on the moral identity construct involves more than just broadening the 
age range of previous studies. It requires expansions in the conceptualization and 
measurement of the moral identity construct itself.  
In the following, we will first discuss what age-related differences in adults' moral 
identity can be theoretically expected following research on personality development in 
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adulthood. For this discussion, we adopt the integrative framework for studying 
personality development proposed by McAdams (2015; McAdams & Olson; 2010). Thus, 
we assume that moral identity constitutes an important aspect of a person's moral 
personality and cannot be reduced to personality traits. In the second step, we will discuss 
expansions in the conceptualization and measurement of the moral identity construct that 
are necessitated when investigating the purported age-related differences. Following 
these discussions, specific hypotheses are formulated. 
Age-related differences in moral identity across adulthood: Theoretical 
expectations 
Personalities systematically change over the life span. This was documented and 
corroborated repeatedly in multiple longitudinal studies (Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008; 
Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006: Lucas & Donnellan, 2011). As individuals grow 
older, the personality traits of conscientiousness, agreeableness and emotional stability 
become stronger. By contrast, openness to experience and extraversion evidence smaller 
and less consistent age-trends across the life span (Bleidorn et al., 2013). The greatest 
mean-level changes in conscientiousness, agreeableness and emotional stability occur 
between the age of 20 and 45 years, when investing in new roles (e.g., as a partner, 
parent, collaborator or supervisor) requires people to become more considerate, self-
controlled, responsible and emotionally stable (Roberts, Wood, & Smith, 2005). In an 
attempt to characterize these developments, Roberts and Wood (2006) formulated the 
maturity principle of personality development, which states that personality development 
tends towards maturity. Following Roberts and Wood (2006), mature people are well 
liked, respected and sometimes even admired in their communities. As morality is 
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essential for evaluating others (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014), the maturity principle 
inevitably invokes moral qualities. Correspondingly, conscientiousness, agreeableness 
and emotional stability were found to define important characteristics of people who lead 
an exemplary moral life (Lapsley & Hill, 2009). Low scores on these traits tend to be 
associated with antisocial conduct and criminal behavior (Miller & Lynam, 2001). 
As individuals grow older and mature, traits that define a moral personality 
become more important. However, the moral personality is not only defined by traits but 
involves life-goals and value-orientations as well as narratives that all contribute to a 
person's moral identity (Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015; McAdams, 2009; Walker, 2014). 
Theoretically, there is no reason to restrict the maturity principle to traits and exclude 
other lines of personality development from it, notably moral identity. Therefore, age-
related increases in moral identity across adulthood as part of a more general 
developmental trend towards maturity can be reasonably expected. 
However, development of personality traits is not limited to mean-level changes. 
It is also manifest in increased consistency. In longitudinal studies, rank-order stabilities 
of personality traits tend to increase over the life span reaching a plateau between the 
ages of 50 to 70 years (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). At the same time, self-concept 
differentiation decreases in the adult years (Diehl, Hastings, & Stanton, 2001; Diehl & 
Hay, 2007, 2011; Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993). Thus, with age, individuals' 
self-descriptions tend to depend less on whether they see themselves in the context of 
their family, as a romantic partner, friend, or coworker. This trend is part of a more 
general developmental dynamic of differentiation and integration of individuals' self-
representations (cf. Harter, 2012). Harter and colleagues found an increased 
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differentiation in self-descriptions across contexts (family, friends, school) between early 
and middle adolescence that was accompanied by an heightened awareness of conflict 
(Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, & Whitesell, 1997; Harter & Monsour, 1992). This increased 
differentiation was followed by an integration of conflicting self-descriptions in late 
adolescence. A similar dynamic of self-concept differentiation and integration was 
documented by Elbogen, Carlo, and Spaulding (2001) in a sample of 1st and 4th year 
university students. Since morality is not limited to a particular social context but extends 
across all areas of life, it can be reasonably expected that cross-context differentiation is 
an important aspect of moral identity development in addition to mean-level change. 
In sum, following research on personality development in adulthood, two 
analytically distinct age-related trends in adult moral identity development can be 
expected. First, the self-importance of moral values should increase with age. Second, 
cross-context differentiation should evidence a curve-linear trend peaking between 
adolescence and young adulthood. 
Conceptualization and Measurement of the Moral Identity Construct 
Conceptually, previous research on moral identity has been mostly based either on 
trait or on socio-cognitive theories (Lapsley & Hill, 2009; Walker, 2014). Trait-based 
approaches assume cross-context consistency in behavior dispositions relevant to 
individuals' moral conduct. Socio-cognitive approaches, by contrast, stress the 
malleability of situation-specific knowledge structures and schemas that guide self-
regulation and action. Given these theoretical foci, neither trait-based nor socio-cognitive 
approaches consider cross-context differentiation and integration as an important aspect 
of moral identity development. This limitation needs to be overcome when investigating 
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age-related differences in moral identity across adulthood. Thus, moral identity needs to 
be conceptualized as a flexible and context-dependent self-structure that nonetheless 
evidences some consistency across situations. This perspective is not entailed in trait or 
socio-cognitive approaches to moral identity as these approaches either assume cross-
context consistency or cross-context specificity but not both.  This sets any investigation 
of cross-context differentiation and integration of moral identity apart from trait and 
socio-cognitive approaches. However, the two approaches are not incompatible with the 
perspective taken in the present study. Lapsley and Narvaez (2004) suggested that moral 
identity as a trait is tantamount to chronic accessibility of moral schemas across a broad 
range of situations. Accessibility of moral schemas can systematically vary across social 
contexts depending on the demand characteristics that predominate in a particular area of 
life (e.g. family, workplace). As a consequence, moral identity may evidence context 
specificity. At the same time, individuals encounter similar moral demands across a range 
of situations (e.g. being honest, fair, dependable to family members and coworkers), 
which provides a foundation for cross-context consistency of moral identity. 
To investigate the relationship between age and cross-context differentiation, 
moral identity needs to be assessed in a context-sensitive way. In the present study, 
procedures commonly used in self-concept research (see Baird, Le, & Lucas, 2006; 
Donahue et al., 1993; Harter et al., 1997) were applied for assessing cross-context 
differentiation in individuals' moral identity. Participants were asked to rate the self-
importance of moral values independently in three different social contexts (family, 
school or school and community/society). The variability of ratings across contexts was 
then used as an indicator of cross-context differentiation of individuals' moral identity. 
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A second limitation of moral identity research that needs to be overcome when 
investigating moral identity from a life span perspective relates to the definition of the 
moral domain. Standard measures of moral identity, such as the Self-Importance of Moral 
Identity Questionnaire (Aquino & Reed, 2002) use a small predefined set of values that 
mostly focus on benevolence and dependability (e.g., being caring, friendly, generous, 
helpful, kind). However, as Lapsley and Hill (2009) noted, moral identity is a dimension 
of individual differences in a double sense. People differ on how central moral values are 
to their sense of self. At the same time, there are different ways of living a moral life well 
(Flanagan, 1991). Some individuals may orient their moral identity towards kindness and 
others towards fairness or integrity and these various orientations may change with age.  
In a sample drawn from 12 European nations with more than 6000 adult 
participants, it was demonstrated that conservative values (conformity and tradition) were 
positively correlated with age (Robinson, 2013). The same was true for self-transcendent 
values (universalism, benevolence). By contrast, stimulation and self-enhancement values 
(achievement, hedonism) evidenced an inverse relation with age.  On a more fine-grained 
level of analysis, differentiating between 19 value domains, Schwartz et al. (2012) 
reported a positive correlation between age and benevolence-dependability (being 
dependable, trustworthy, reliable). Similarly, an orientation towards conformity and 
preserving tradition was positively correlated with age, whereas tolerance (listening, 
understanding) was more important for younger people (see also Schwartz, 2006). Thus, 
value-orientations are not constant across the life span. To some extent these changes 
may reflect development of personality traits as agreeableness tends to be positively 
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correlated with benevolence values and conscientiousness with conformity (Roccas, 
Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002).   
The value surveys used in studies by Schwartz and colleagues capture a broad 
range of values that do not all equally qualify as moral. This becomes evident when 
considering studies that investigate individuals' prototypical conceptions of a highly 
moral person (Hardy, Walker, Olsen, Skalski, & Basinger, 2011; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; 
Walker & Pitts, 1998). The value-attributes people use to characterize a highly moral 
person typically belong to the domains of benevolence, universalism, conformity, 
achievement and self-direction in Schwartz' circumplex model (Vauclair, Wilson, & 
Fischer, 2014). In contrast, values that reflect an orientation towards stimulation, 
hedonism, power and security are typically not mentioned when describing a highly 
moral person. Thus, although people's prototypical conceptions of a highly moral person 
do not include the full range of human values, this range is much broader than the set of 
values that is included in standard measures of moral identity. This conclusion is 
supported by Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2013), which points out that the 
moral domain goes beyond the two moral foundations of harm and fairness (which 
correspond to benevolence and universalism in Schwartz' model (cf. Graham et al., 2011) 
but includes at least three more foundations relating to ingroup loyality, authority and 
purity. Lay people's definitions of the moral domain vary within and between cultures, 
which is not adequately reflected by standard measures of moral identity. While 
benevolence and universalism constitute core moral values, people sometimes include 
value-attributes in their conception of a highly moral person that have been characterized 
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as social-conventional from the perspective of domain theory (cf. Smetana, Jambon & 
Ball, 2014). 
In the present study, we do not adopt a specific conceptual definition of the moral 
domain but consider it an empirical question what values individuals chose to define their 
moral identity. These values are likely multi-faceted and change with age. Therefore, in 
the present study, the standard procedure for assessing individuals' moral identity was 
modified. Participants were not presented with a predefined set of value-attributes (such 
as being kind, generous, fair). Rather, individuals were asked to choose those value-
attributes from a longer list to define their own moral identity. These value-attributes 
were then classified into value domains using Schwartz' circumplex model as an 
analytical tool in order to investigate whether the value-orientations that define 
individuals' moral identity differ with age.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In the previous sections we discussed general expectations regarding age-related 
differences in moral identity across adulthood along with modifications in 
conceptualization and measurement that are required when approaching the moral 
identity construct from a life span perspective. Summarizing this discussion, age-related 
differences in moral identity with regard to the following three aspects were expected: (1) 
the overall self-importance of moral values, (2) cross-context differentiation of moral 
identity and (3) the value-orientations that define individuals' moral identity. 
(1) Based on the well documented finding that the personality traits of 
conscientiousness, agreeableness and emotional stability evidence significant increases 
between adolescence and middle age (65 years), it was expected that the overall self-
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importance of moral values (that is the mean-level of moral identity averaged across 
social contexts) increases between the age of 14 and 65 years. In the meta-analysis by 
Roberts et al (2006), personality traits of conscientiousness, agreeableness and emotional 
stability continuously increased from adolescence to adulthood, even though changes in 
these traits were most pronounced in young adulthood. Thus, change evidenced linear as 
well as non-linear components. If moral identity development follows age-related 
changes in personality traits, mean-level of moral identity may similarly evidence linear 
as well as non-linear trends. Therefore, linear and cubic relationships between age and 
mean-level of moral identity were investigated. 
(2) Following studies on the development of self-concept that document increases 
in self-concept differentiation in adolescence and emerging adulthood followed by 
decreases at later developmental periods, it was expected that cross-context 
differentiation in moral identities increases during adolescence and emerging adulthood 
and decreases in the adult years. As a consequence, age should evidence a quadratic trend 
as a predictor of cross-context differentiation of individuals' moral identity. 
(3) It has been repeatedly demonstrated that an orientation towards conformity is 
positively correlated with age (cf. Schwartz, 2006; Robinson, 2013). In the present study, 
it was therefore expected that conformity values are more important for older individuals 
when defining their moral identity. Other value domains that likely form a significant part 
of individuals' moral identity are benevolence and universalism. These domains tend to 
be positively correlated with age, as well. Consequently, we expected that universalism 
and benevolence become more important with age for individuals when defining their 
moral identity. However, as Schwartz et al. (2012) pointed out, the value domain of 
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universalism can be further divided into universalism-concern, universalism-tolerance 
and universalism-nature. These subdomains tend to be differentially related to age. 
Whereas universalism-concern and universalism-nature evidence a positive correlation 
with age, a negative correlation was found for universalism-tolerance (Schwartz et al. 
2012). We therefore expected that tolerance was more important for younger individuals 
when defining their moral identity.  
Conformity, universalism and benevolence are value domains that likely represent 
core aspects of individuals' moral identity. However, a person's moral identity is not 
limited to these domains but may include others (notably achievement and self-direction). 
The value domain of achievement was found to be negatively correlated with age 
(Schwartz, 2006; Robinson, 2013). Correspondingly, we expected that achievement 
becomes less important as an aspect of a person's moral identity with age. Findings for 
the relationship between self-direction and age have been less strong and less consistent 
in comparison to all other value domains. Robinson (2013) reported a negative 
correlation of r = -.05 with age. Schwartz et al. (2012) found a slight negative correlation 
that was significant in only 15 out of 20 European countries. Because of this inconclusive 
evidence we did not hypothesize a specific age trend but considered it an open empirical 
question how the importance of self-direction as part of individuals' moral identity is 
related to age. 
In addition to investigating age-related differences in mean-level of moral 
identity, cross-context differentiation as well as value-orientations, we intended to 
examine the degree of overlap between these differences and personality trait 
development. As Hill and Roberts (2010) argued, models of personality and identity 
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should be considered "fellow travelers" (p. 381) for the study of moral personality 
development. Moreover, Wood and Roberts (2006) demonstrated that context-specific 
role identities contribute to changes in personality traits. Correspondingly, age-related 
increases in moral identity may contribute to changes in conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, or emotional stability over time. Conversely, age-related changes in moral 
identity may depend on personality trait development. Although a detailed analysis of 
these cross-lagged relationships is beyond the scope of the present paper, we will 
examine how age-related differences in moral identity relate to personality traits. In line 
with the framework for personality research proposed by McAdams (2015), it was 
expected that age-related differences in moral identity partly overlap with age-related 
differences in personality traits but are not fully accounted for by these variables. In order 
to capture the full range of personality trait development, in the present study all traits 
that are empirically related to age will be included. Thus, the analysis will not be a priori 
restricted to agreeableness, conscientiousness and emotional stability. 
Methods 
Sample 
The sample of the present study consisted of 252 individuals (148 women) 
sampled from four different age groups: adolescence (14-18 years), emerging adulthood 
(19-25 years), young adulthood (26-45 years) and middle age (46-65 years). Sample 
mean was 33.48 years, SD = 16.98. Participants' gender was unrelated to age-group, χ2 = 
2.54, df = 3, p = .45 (for breakdowns of demographic variables by age-group see Table 
1). 
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Participants were recruited through advertisements in local newspapers (69.3% of 
participants), online postings of the study (24.7%) and flyers distributed at community 
events (6%). All participants provided informed consent before participating and received 
$50 compensation. After study completion, participants were encouraged to forward the 
recruitment information they had initially received (newspaper ad, online link, flyer) to 
other potential participants.  
At time of data collection, all participants were residing in South-West Ontario, 
which has a culturally diverse population of varying ethnic backgrounds. Of participants 
75.5% were born in Canada, whereas 24.5% had immigrated to Canada from countries 
located in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe and South-America. On average, participants 
who were born outside Canada had been living in the country for 15.94 years, SD = 
12.64. Country of origin (born in Canada, 1 = yes vs. 0 = no) was unrelated to age-group, 
χ2 = 5.98, df = 3, p = .11 (see Table 1). 
Most participants (76.1%) self-identified themselves as Canadian of European 
descent. Of participants, 14.9% had an Asian or East-Asian background and described 
themselves as Indian, Pakistani, Chinese or Vietnamese, 9% self-identified as Arabian or 
Arabic. Ethnic background (European-Canadian, 1 = yes vs. 0 = no) was unrelated to age-
group in the present sample, χ2 = 5.93, df = 3, p = .11 (see Table 1). 
Of participants, 40.8% were enrolled in a secondary or post-secondary educational 
institution at the time of the data collection (high-school, college or university). Of those 
participants who were not enrolled in an educational institution (n = 150), 21.7% had 
completed high school, 47.1% had obtained a college diploma or undergraduate degree, 
and 30.3% had completed graduate or professional training. Educational attainment was 
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scored on a 7-point scale from 1 = some high school to 7 = graduate or professional 
degree, with 4 = completed college diploma as the midpoint of the scale (see Statistics 
Canada, 2011). Educational attainment as represented by this scale was unrelated to age-
group in the present sample, F(2, 147) = 0.194, p = .82 (see Table 1) and not correlated 
with age, r = .02, p = .85. 
In order to assess individuals' socio-economic status (SES), participants were 
asked to provide descriptions of their current occupation (most recent occupation, if 
unemployed or retired). Participants who were enrolled in an educational institution were 
asked to provide descriptions of their mother's and father's occupations. Job descriptions 
were coded according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-
88) and transferred into the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status 
(ISEI), which is a well-validated measure of SES (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, & Treiman, 
1992). For students, parents' ISEI scores were averaged. Theoretically, ISEI scores range 
from 10 to 90 with a midpoint of the scale at 50. In the present sample, participants' ISEI 
score was M = 50.46, SD = 14.69. Thus, sample SES was average. More importantly, the 
four age-groups did not differ with regard to SES, F (3, 219) = 0.29, p = 0.83 (see Table 
1), nor was there a significant correlation between participants' age (in years) and SES, r 
= .085, p = .21.  
Measures 
The study consisted of a 90-minute interview and a questionnaire that took about 
30 minutes to complete. The interview was conducted to assess individuals’ moral 
identity in three different social contexts (family, school or work, community/society). 
The questionnaire was used to assess personality traits and social desirability response 
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bias. The interview was audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. In the interview, open-
ended and standardized response formats were used. In the context of the present study, 
only standardized responses were analyzed. Thus, coding of open-ended responses was 
not required.  
Moral Identity. The interview procedure for assessing individuals' moral identity 
was based on a modified version of the Good Self-Assessment (Arnold, 1993), which has 
been validated in several independent studies (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001; 
Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011; Nunner-Winkler, Meyer-Nikele, & Wohlrab, 2007). 
Modifications pertained to (a) the value-attributes individuals used to define their moral 
identity, and (b) the context-specific assessment of moral identity. Whereas the Good 
Self-Assessment uses a standard list of eight moral value-attributes to assess a person's 
moral identity (fair, truthful, kind, respectful, loyal, compassionate, sincere, generous), in 
the present study, participants were asked to define their own moral identity by choosing 
from a longer list of 80 value-attributes. These value-attributes were then used to assess 
the self-importance of morality separately in three different social contexts: family, work 
or school (depending on participants' age and employment status), and 
community/society. The interview procedure for assessing individuals' moral identity as 
used in the present study was extensively piloted by running pilot interview with 20 
participants from all age- and gender-groups involved in the main study.  
The list of 80 value-attributes that was used for asking participants to define their 
own personal moral identity was derived from studies that previously had investigated 
individuals' prototypical conceptions of a moral person (Hardy, Walker, Olsen, Skalski, 
& Basinger, 2011; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Smith, Türk Smith, & Christopher, 2007; 
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Walker & Pitts, 1998). Three of these studies were conduced in the US and Canada, 
whereas one study used a cross-cultural sample from seven different countries located in 
Asia, North- and South-America as well as Europe. All studies had employed a free 
listing method where individuals had been asked to freely generate attributes to describe a 
moral or a good person. In all four studies, these lists were further distilled by collapsing 
redundant words or phrases and by eliminating highly idiosyncratic responses. In the 
study conducted by Walker and Pitts (1998), this procedure yielded 92 descriptors of "a 
highly moral person", Lapsley and Lasky (2001) identified 170 descriptors, whereas 
Hardy et al. (2011) reported 94 descriptors. Smith et al. (2007) identified 64 attributes 
participants from various cultures had generated to describe "a good person". For 
compiling the list of values as used in the present study, all those descriptors were 
selected that were listed in at least two out of the four studies. This effectively excluded 
findings that had not been replicated at least once in an independent study. This 
procedure resulted in a list of 80 attributes for describing a moral person that covered a 
broad range of value-orientations from being dependable (e.g., sincere, honest, reliable) 
and caring (e.g., generous, helpful, selfless) to concerns for fairness and tolerance (e.g., 
being accepting, open-minded, fair) and conformity (e.g., law abiding) (for a full list of 
all value-attributes as used in the study, see Table 2). Please note that in pilot interviews, 
participants were encouraged to add whatever value-attribute they felt was missing on the 
list. Only one participant out of 20 added one descriptor that was not included in the list 
("forward thinking"). Thus, the list of value-attributes as used in the present interview 
covered individuals' descriptions of a moral person fairly well. 
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In the main study, participants were first asked to rate all 80 value-attributes 
according to how well they describe a highly moral person using a 5-point scale from 1 = 
not at all to 5 = extremely well. Participants were then asked to select those 12 to 15 
value-attributes that according to their own personal view, define "the core of a highly 
moral person". The number of value-attributes (12 to 15) was determined in pilot 
interviews, as it was found that participants were most comfortable with a set of attributes 
of this size. The remainder of the interview was based on those 12 to 15 value-attributes 
individuals had selected for themselves to define a highly moral person. In the sample, 
the average number of chosen value-attributes was 14.15, SD = 1.09. Participant age was 
unrelated to the number of attributes chosen, r (250) = .09, p = 0.27.  
To assess the self-importance of moral values, participants were asked to create 
pictorial self-portraits similar to the method developed by Harter and Monsour (1992) 
when assessing context-specificities in individuals' self-concept. Participants were given 
a set of magnetic labels with the chosen value-attributes and a diagram that displayed 
three nested circles representing varying levels of self-importance. Participants were 
instructed to place each label in the circle that signified its level of importance to the self 
(from not important at the outer periphery to very important at the center of the diagram, 
for an illustration see Figure 1). There were three diagrams with different headings, one 
representing the social context of family ("How important is it for you to be ____ in the 
context of your family?"), work or school (depending on enrollment status) ("How 
important is it for you to be ____ in the context of work/school?") and community/the 
larger society ("How important is it for you to be ____ in the context of your community 
and the larger society?").  Participants worked on the three diagrams consecutively. 
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Ordering of the diagrams was randomized. Based on this procedure various statistical 
indices were calculated. These indices reflect (a) the self-importance of moral values 
(mean-level across social contexts), (b) cross-context differentiation of moral identity, 
and (c) the relative importance of different value domains for defining a person's moral 
identity. 
Mean-level of moral identity. In order to assess mean-level of individuals' moral 
identity regardless of context specificity and regardless of value domain, self-importance 
ratings of the selected 12 to 15 value-attributes (1 = not important to me to 4 = very 
important to me) were averaged across social contexts and then combined into a single 
scale. Internal consistency for this scale was a = .84. Sample mean was 3.29, SD = 0.31.  
Cross-context differentiation of moral identity. Cross-context differentiation of 
moral identity was assessed by calculating standard-deviations across social contexts for 
each value-attribute chosen by the participant (for a discussion of various indices 
representing intraindividual variation in personality, see Baird, Le, & Lucas, 2006). The 
internal consistency of this sum score was a = .81. Since variability scores and means 
tend to be positively correlated when variables are skewed (Baird et al., 2006), 
standardized residuals were computed by regressing cross-context differentiation on 
mean-level of moral identity using standard linear regression techniques. This score 
reflects cross-context differentiation in moral identity independently of mean-level. (The 
independence of mean-level and cross-context differentiation is further illustrated in 
Figure 1. It presents two hypothetical interview protocols with equal mean-levels in 
moral identity but low versus high scores in cross-context differentiation). 
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Value domains defining moral identity. In order to assess what values define a 
person's moral identity, Schwartz's circumplex model was employed as an analytical tool. 
Schwartz's model has been validated in several independent studies with large cross-
cultural data sets (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2012). In its original version, the 
model identifies ten domains that constitute the basic structure of human values 
(universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, security, power, achievement, 
stimulation and self-direction). More recently, Schwartz et al. (2012) provided a refined 
model that further differentiated the original ten into 19 value domains. Note, however, 
that the differentiated model does not invalidate the original ten value domains (cf. 
Schwartz et al., 2012).  
Based on the theoretical descriptions of the value domains, as well as items that 
have been used in the past to assess these value domains, all 80 value-attributes used in 
the present study were classified into value domains. We used the more differentiated 19 
values domain model whenever possible. However, if a particular value differentiation 
was not reflected in the list of 80 value-attributes, the original model was applied (this 
was the case for the distinction between self-direction thought and self-direction action). 
If a value-attribute was deemed too ambiguous for classification, it was considered 
unscorable.  
All 80 value-attributes were classified by five independent coders (senior 
researcher and graduate students) who had familiarized themselves with Schwartz's 
circumplex model. Intercoder agreement ranged from k = .82 to .90 with a median score 
of .85. All discrepancies in codings were discussed and could be unanimously resolved. 
This process yielded 12 value domains that made up the list of 80 value-attributes as used 
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in the present study (for a full list of all value-attributes and their categorization see Table 
2): benevolence-dependability (10 attributes out of 80), benevolence-caring (10 
attributes), universalism-tolerance (10 attributes), universalism-concern (3), self-direction 
(7), conformity-rules (4), conformity-interpersonal (7), achievement (6), face (3), 
tradition (4), hedonism (3), and security-personal (2). Twelve value-attributes (out of 80) 
were not classified.  
The value domains participants chose reflect their concept of a highly moral 
person but not necessarily their own moral identity. To assess different value-orientations 
in individuals' moral identity, it was counted how often participants chose a particular 
value domain as very important to the self in the three social contexts family, 
school/work, or community. These tallies were divided by the overall number of 
attributes that were considered as very important across all three contexts by the 
participant (M = 19.75, SD = 8.29) and multiplied by 100, yielding a percentage score of 
the relative importance of each value domain for defining a person's moral identity. On 
average, 29.6% of value-attributes that were considered very important to the self 
belonged to the domain of benevolence-dependability (e.g., genuine, honest, reliable), 
followed by universalism-tolerance with 17.82% (e.g., accepting, non-judgmental, 
understanding) and benevolence-caring with 10.94% (e.g., generous, helpful, kind). 
Universalism-concern, self-direction, conformity-rules and conformity-interpersonal each 
represented approximately 5% of individuals' moral identity choices, whereas the 
percentages of all other value domains were lower (see Table 2).  Even though 
benevolence and universalism clearly were the most important value domains that define 
individuals' moral identity, together these domains accounted only for 64% of identity 
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choices. Thus, individuals' moral identities involved a broader range of value-orientations 
than covered by standard measures of moral identity. 
Personality traits. For the assessment of personality traits the NEO-FFI-3 
inventory was used (McCrae & Costa, 2004). The NEO-FFI-3 is a 60-item questionnaire 
for the measurement of the Big Five-personality traits of openness to experience, 
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism. Openness to experience 
refers to the individuals’ imagination, curiosity, and intellectual independence. 
Extraversion involves seeking social stimulation and affiliation. Agreeableness describes 
individuals’ cooperativeness, altruism and empathy. Conscientiousness describes 
individuals’ self-organization and self-discipline. Finally, neuroticism reflects the degree 
to which individuals experience negative affect such as sadness and anger. In the NEO-
FFI-3, each personality trait is represented by 12 items, which are rated on a 5-point 
scale. In the present study, internal consistencies for the five dimensions ranged from a = 
.74 (openness) to .86 (conscientiousness), with .84 (neuroticism), .81 (agreeableness), .79 
(extraversion) in between. Sample means and SDs were M = 3.71, SD = 0.52, for 
agreeableness, M = 3.68, SD = 0.56, for conscientiousness, M = 3.55, SD = 0.51 for 
openness to experience, M = 3.47, SD = 0.51, for extraversion and M = 2.89, SD = 0.62, 
for neuroticism.  
Social desirability. Social desirability response bias was measured using a well-
validated questionnaire originally developed by Stöber (2001) and translated into English 
by Blake, Valdiserri, Neuendorf, and Nemeth (2006). Participants were presented with 17 
statements describing socially desirable or undesirable behaviors (e.g. "I always eat a 
healthy diet") and were asked to indicate if the statement described them, using a 
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dichotomous 1 = true vs. 2 = false-response format. After reverse scoring the negative 
items, an average score was calculated, M = 1.57, SD = 0.20.  
Results 
Investigating the hypotheses as outlined in the introduction involved the 
examination of empirical relationships between chronological age and (a) mean-level of 
moral identity across social contexts, (b) cross-context differentiation, and (c) the relative 
importance of value domains that define a person's moral identity, while controlling for 
personality traits and other potential confounds (e.g., gender and socio-economic status). 
We addressed topics (a) to (c) in three separate sets of analyses, each set following the 
same analytical steps. First, bivariate relationship between age and the relevant 
variable(s) were examined. This examination included an investigation of quadratic and 
cubic age-related trends for variables that were expected to evidence non-linear 
relationships with age. Second, for those moral identity variables that turned out to be 
significantly related to age, personality traits and other potentially confounding variables 
were included as predictors in order to investigate to what extent these factors account for 
age-related trends in moral identity. In a set of preliminary analyses, we identified 
relevant personality traits and other controls to be included in the main analyses.  
Preliminary Analyses 
Personality traits and age. In the present sample, conscientiousness and 
agreeableness were both found to be positively correlated with age (in years), rs(250) = 
.24, p < .01, and .13, p = .03 respectively, whereas neuroticism was negatively correlated 
with age, r(250) = -.37, p < .01. By contrast, openness to experience and extraversion did 
not evidence any linear age-related trend, rs(250) = .05, p = .39, and -.04, p = .55, 
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respectively. These findings ertr consistent with previous research on personality trait 
development in adulthood. 
Personality traits and moral identity. Consistent with the notion that 
conscientiousness, agreeableness and neuroticism define important moral personality 
traits, mean-level of moral identity (averaged across social contexts) was positively 
correlated with conscientiousness and agreeableness, rs(250) = .29 and .30, respectively, 
ps < .01, and negatively correlated with neuroticism, r(250) = -.26, p < .01. Openness to 
experience and extraversion were not significantly correlated with mean-level of moral 
identity, rs(250) = -.01, p = .88, and .11, p = .08, respectively. In a multiple regression, all 
three personality traits significantly contributed to the prediction of mean-level of moral 
identity, agreeableness, b = .21, p < .01, conscientiousness, b = .17, p < .01, neuroticism, 
b = -.14, p = .04. The effects of openness and extraversion, by contrast, were not 
significant.  
Cross-context differentiation of moral identity (standardized residuals, controlled 
for mean-level) was positively correlated with openness, r(250) = .14, p = .03, but not 
with any other personality trait. A multiple regression of cross-context differentiation of 
moral identity on personality traits did not yield a significant result, F (5, 246) = 2.07, p = 
.07.  
As a result of these preliminary analyses, conscientiousness, agreeableness and 
neuroticism were included as personality traits in the main analyses. These personality 
traits may (at least partly) account for the relationships between measures of individuals' 
moral identity and age.  
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Gender, SES, social desirability and moral identity. A multiple regression with 
mean-level of moral identity as dependent variable and gender, SES, and social 
desirability response bias as predictors, yielded a significant overall effect, F(3, 248) = 
5.70, p < .01. Social desirability response bias was a significant predictor of individuals' 
moral identity mean-level, b = .24, p < .01. However, gender and SES were not 
significantly related to mean-level of moral identity, b = .08, p = .19 and .004, p = .99, 
respectively.  
A multiple regression of cross-context differentiation of moral identity on gender, 
SES and social desirability did not yield a significant overall effect, F(3, 248) = 0.22, p = 
.88. None of the regression coefficients of the individual predictors reached the level of 
statistical significance.  
As a result of these preliminary analyses, social desirability response bias was 
used as a control variable in the main analyses, whereas gender and SES were not.  
Main Analyses 
Mean-level of moral identity and age. The bivariate correlation between mean-
level of moral identity (averaged across contexts) and age was r(250) = .22, p < .01. 
Investigating linear and non-linear effects by regressing mean-level of moral identity on 
age as well as the square root and cubic root of age yielded a significant linear effect F(1, 
250) = 13.05, p < .01, b = .23, whereas non-linear effects did not explain additional 
variance.  
The linear effect of age on mean-level of moral identity was further investigated 
by entering personality traits and social desirability in a multiple regression together with 
age (see Table 3). Personality traits significantly predicted mean-level of moral identity 
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above and beyond age, ΔF(4, 246) = 8.16, p < .01. Agreeableness positively predicted 
mean-level of moral identity, whereas conscientiousness and neuroticism did not 
uniquely contribute to the regression. When controlling for personality traits, the effect of 
age was somewhat reduced but still significant (see Table 3). The effect of social 
desirability was not significant.  
Cross-context differentiation of moral identity and age. The bivariate 
correlation between cross-context differentiation of moral identity (standardized residual 
score, controlled for mean-level) and age was r (250) = -.13, p = .04. The linear effect of 
age was significant, F(1, 250) = 4.25, p = .04, as was the quadratic effect (square root of 
age), ΔF(1, 249) = 3.95, p = .04.  
The regression coefficient for the linear effect of age was negative indicating an 
overall decrease in context-differentiation with age (see Table 3). At the same time, 
however, the positive quadratic (square root) effect of age demonstrated that cross-
context differentiation tended to increase in younger age groups. The joint function of 
linear and quadratic effects is displayed in Figure 2, which demonstrates that cross-
context differentiation in moral identity increased between the age of 14 to 25 years and 
declined afterwards.  
When entering personality traits and social desirability response bias in the 
regression the amount of variance explained did not significantly increase, ΔF(4, 245) = 
0.39, p = .80. Thus, the relationship between cross-context differentiation and age was 
independent of agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and social desirability. The 
linear effect of age remained significant, whereas the quadratic effect was slightly 
reduced. 
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Value domains defining moral identity and age. Bivariate correlations between 
chronological age and the relative importance of value domains for defining a person's 
moral identity are summarized in Table 2. Dependability, self-direction and rule-
conformity tended to be positively correlated with age, whereas universalism-tolerance as 
well as achievement evidenced a negative correlation (ps < .05). Thus, value-attributes 
such as being reliable, responsible, having integrity, being consistent, ethical and law-
abiding were more important for older people in the present sample. In contrast, being 
open-minded, understanding, hard-working and proud tended to be more important for 
younger age-groups. 
These effects of age were further investigated by controlling for personality traits 
of conscientiousness, agreeableness and neuroticism as well as social desirability 
response bias in a series of regression analyses. Findings of these regressions are 
summarized in Table 4. For the value domain of dependability, including personality 
traits did not yield a significant increase in the variance explained, ΔF(4, 241) = 1.73, p = 
.142. At the same time, once personality traits were statistically controlled the effect of 
age turned out to be non-significant (see Table 4). Thus, age-related differences in the 
importance of dependability were largely attributable to age-related differences in 
personality traits. Similar findings were obtained for universalism-tolerance and 
achievement.  
Including personality traits and social desirability in the regression of 
universalism-tolerance yielded a significant increase in explained variance with ΔF(4, 
241) = 6.57, p < .01. Universalism-tolerance was positively predicted by agreeableness 
and inversely related to conscientiousness. However, once personality traits were 
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statistically controlled the effect of age was not significant. For the value domain of 
achievement, including personality measures yielded a significant incremental effect, 
ΔF(4, 241) = 3.01, p < .05. The importance of the achievement domain was inversely 
related to agreeableness. Again, effects of age turned out to be non-significant once 
personality traits were statistically controlled (see Table 4). 
For the value domains of self-direction and rule-conformity a different pattern of 
findings emerged. Including personality traits yielded a significant increase in the 
predictive effect for both value domains, ΔF(4, 241) = 3.46, p < .01 for self-direction and 
ΔF(4, 241) = 2.57, p < .05 for rule-conformity. The importance of both value domains 
was positively correlated with age, even when personality traits of agreeableness, 
conscientiousness and neuroticism were statistically controlled. Agreeableness inversely 
predicted the importance self-direction, whereas conscientiousness and neuroticism did 
not significantly contribute to the regression (see Table 4). By contrast, rule-conformity 
was positively predicted by conscientiousness. Thus, individuals who scored high on 
conscientiousness valued rule-conformity more as an important aspect of their moral 
identity. Social desirability response bias did not contribute to the prediction any value 
domain.  
Discussion 
The present study investigated age-related differences in moral identity across 
adulthood, which has been a largely uncharted area of research up to date. It was argued 
that a life span approach to the moral identity construct involves more than just extending 
the age range of previous studies but requires expansions in the conceptualization and 
measurement of the moral identity construct itself. In the present study, moral identity 
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was conceptualized as a context-dependent self-structure that becomes differentiated and 
(re)integrated in the course of development and that entails a broad range of value-
orientations. Based on this conceptualization, we introduced a modified version of the 
Good Self Assessment, which included a context specific assessment and an expanded 
range of value-orientations for defining one's moral identity. 
Consistent with the notion that personality development trends towards maturity 
(Roberts et al., 2008), a positive correlation between individuals' mean-level of moral 
identity and age (14 to 65 years) was found. As individuals grow older, they assign 
greater self-importance to those values they consider essential for defining a highly moral 
person. This effect of age only partially overlapped with age-related changes in 
personality traits. Age was a significant predictor of mean-level of moral identity even 
when agreeableness, conscientiousness and neuroticism were statistically controlled. In 
the present sample covering an age range from 14 to 65 years, age-related increases in 
moral identity were found to be linear, whereas changes in personality traits 
agreeableness, conscientiousness and neuroticism generally tend to peak between the 
ages of 20 and 45 years (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006). Thus, age-related 
differences in moral identity and personality did not simply mirror each other. This may 
suggest that moral identity and personality are complementary in fostering greater 
maturity over the life span (cf. Hill & Roberts, 2010). 
Because of the conceptual orientation of previous moral identity research towards 
either trait-based or socio-cognitive approaches, context-specificity of moral identity 
along with processes of differentiation and integration have been largely neglected up to 
date. Differentiation and integration define general principles of development (Raeff, 
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2011) and important characteristics self-development (Harter, 2012). The present study 
provided evidence that these principles apply to moral identity development, as well. 
When assessing moral identity separately in the contexts of family, work or school and 
community/society, it was found that cross-context differentiation in moral identity 
increased between adolescence and emerging adulthood and was lower in older age-
groups. This trend was independent of personality traits. The finding suggests that during 
adolescence and emerging adulthood individuals become more aware of changing moral 
priorities under varying circumstances. This process of differentiation is followed by the 
tendency to (re)integrate value priorities so that moral identities are not only defined by 
the self-importance of particular values, but by their consistent importance across 
different areas of life. This consistency may bolster individuals' sense of agency, as moral 
actions may be experienced as emanating from the self rather than from demand 
characteristics of external circumstances. Thus, the decline in cross-context 
differentiation in moral identities in adulthood may indicate that agentic desires become 
better integrated with morality, which has been described as an important goal of moral 
identity development by Frimer and Walker (2009). 
Along with age-related changes in mean-level and cross-context differentiation, 
the moral values that define a person's moral identity shift. In the present study, 
benevolence, self-direction and rule-conformity tended to be more important for older 
participants when defining their moral identity as compared to younger participants. By 
contrast, tolerance and achievement was negatively correlated with age. Again, these 
effects partly overlapped with age-related differences in personality traits. Effects of age 
disappeared for benevolence, tolerance and achievement once personality traits were 
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statistically controlled. In contrast, self-direction and rule-conformity were significantly 
related to age even when controlling for agreeableness, conscientiousness and 
neuroticism. At this point, it remains an open question whether these findings reflect 
effects of development, cohort, or both.   
The relationships between value-orientations and age as obtained in the present 
study largely correspond with findings reported by Schwartz et al. (2012) and Robinson 
(2013), with one exception. Whereas a weak negative correlation between the importance 
of self-direction and age was found in previous studies, in the present study this 
correlation was positive. When the focus is on moral identity (rather than value-
orientations in general), the meaning of self-direction may shift from being free and 
independent towards maintaining one's integrity.  It has been repeatedly demonstrated 
that individuals' life-goals become increasingly intrinsic with age as they become better 
aligned with basic psychological needs of autonomy, competence and relatedness (Ryan 
& Deci, 2008; Sheldon & Kasser, 2001). Morgan and Robinson (2012) demonstrated that 
the intrinsicality of life-goals is positively correlated with seeking personal meaning by 
leading a principled life. From this perspective, values that stress self-direction and 
autonomy may be more important for older than for younger individuals when defining 
their moral identity. Moreover, the finding that self-direction becomes more important 
with age for individuals when defining their moral identity is consistent with Loevinger's 
notion (Loevinger, 1993) that conscientiousness as a trait does not merely reflect a single 
personality factor but two different levels of ego development (conformist vs. 
conscientious). Correspondingly, age-related increases in conscientiousness as a trait may 
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result not only in greater desire for conformity, but also in higher importance of self-
direction and moral integrity. 
It should be noted at this point that the three value domains that evidenced the 
strongest associations with age (self-direction, rule-conformity and universalism-
tolerance) are typically not included in common measures of moral identity such as the 
Self-Importance of Moral Identity Questionnaire (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and the Good 
Self Assessment (Arnold, 1993). As a consequence, these measures likely underestimate 
age-related change in moral identity. 
 A major limitation of the study is in its cross-sectional design, which made it 
impossible to track individual change over time and to disentangle reciprocal effects 
between development of moral identity and personality traits. Moreover, because of the 
cross-sectional design, any age-related differences may be confounded with cohort 
effects. Empirical evidence for developmental effects in moral identity obtained in the 
present study is therefore only indirect. Secondly, the sample of the present study was not 
representative and limited to a particular socio-cultural context in a Western society. As a 
consequence, it is unclear to what extent findings can be generalized to other cultural 
contexts. Thirdly, the age range of present study was limited to 65 years. This was 
necessitated by the context specific assessment that included moral identity at the 
workplace. For many elderly people, morality at the workplace would not be a relevant 
identity concern. Moreover, some older participants might experience difficulties to 
engage in a 90-minute assessment of moral identity. Thus, future studies will have to 
expand the age range while using a slightly modified assessment procedure in order to 
track moral identity development in old age. 
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By conceptualizing moral identity as a context-dependent self-structure that 
involves a broad range of value-orientations, the present study documented age-related 
differences in individuals' moral identity that are consistent with important developmental 
principles and with well-established longitudinal findings in the area of adult personality 
development. This confirms the developmental nature of the moral identity construct. 
Moral identity development is not restricted to adolescence or emerging adulthood. It is a 
life-long process that expands well into adulthood. 
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Table 1. 
Demographic Characteristics of Sample Across Age Groups 
 Adolescent 









N 67 52 66 67 252 
Female (%)a 41 (61.4) 29 (55.8) 43 (65.2) 35 (52.2) 148 (58.7) 
Age in years (SD) 16.41 (1.62) 22.09 (2.37) 32.81 (5.57) 58.70 (7.07) 33.08 (17.18) 
Country of Origin:  
Born in Canada (%)a 
53 (80.3) 39 (76.5) 42 (64.6) 54 (80.6) 188 (75.5) 
Ethnic background: 
European-Canadian (%)a 
51 (75.6) 34 (65.0) 53 (78.9) 56 (83.5) 193 (76.1) 
Education attainment N/A 5.20 (1.81) 4.97 (1.75) 4.88 (1.84) 4.86 (1.70) 
SES 50.21 (12.50) 50.81 (15.81) 49.20 (15.79) 51.75 (15.21) 50.46 (14.69) 
Note. a column %      
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Table 2.  
Value Domains and Value-Attributes Defining Individuals' Moral Identity, Relative Frequency and Correlations with Age 
	
Value Domain/Attributes M% (SD) r     (p) 
Benevolence-dependability: Being a reliable and trustworthy group member 
• Dependable, faithful, genuine, honest, loyal, reliable, responsible, sincere, trustworthy, truthful 
 29.62  (18.31)  .14 (.025) 
Universalism-tolerance: Acceptance of those who are different from oneself 
• Accepting, empathic, listens, non-judgmental, open-minded, patient, respectful, tolerant,  
understanding, wise 
 17.83 (15.47)  -.15 (.020) 
Benevolence-caring: Devotion to the welfare of ingroup members 
• Altruistic, benevolent, caring, forgiving, generous, helpful, kind, loving, selfless, sharing 
 10.95 (11.44)  -.12 (.055) 
Self-directiona: Cultivate one's own ideas and determine one's own action 
• Confident, consistent, courageous, having integrity, independent, rational, self-assured 
 7.65 (9.02)  .19 (.002) 
Conformity-rules: Compliance with rules, laws and formal obligations 
• Ethical, follows the rules, law abiding, obedient 
 6.00 (8.34)  .15 (.017) 
Universalism-concern: Commitment to equality, justice and protection for all 
• Compassionate, fair, just 
 5.97 (7.99)  .08 (.213) 
Conformity-interpersonal: Avoidance of upsetting other people 
• Considerate, cooperative, courteous, conscientious, friendly, nice, sociable 
 5.21 (7.87)  -.09 (.141) 
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Achievement: Success according to social standards 
• Educated, hard-working, intelligent, perseveres, proud, self-disciplined 
 3.47 (6.49)  -.13 (.041) 
Face: Maintaining once public image and avoiding humiliation 
• Exemplary, honorable, upstanding 
 1.73 (4.03)  -.00 (.973) 
Tradition: Respect of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provides 
• Grateful, humble, modest, religious 
 2.14 (5.17)  -.12 (.064) 
Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification 
• Cheerful, fun, happy 
 0.33 (1.66)  -.09 (.135) 
Security-personal: Safety and stability in one's immediate environment 
• Clean, healthy 
 0.24 (1.31)  .01 (.829) 
Unclassified: 
• Good, has high standards, knowledgeable, knows what is right and wrong,  
makes the right choices, optimistic, proper, righteous, strong, thrifty, virtuous 
 0.33 (1.66)  -.09 (.135) 
Note. Definition of value domains from Schwartz et al. (2012). M% = average percent of attributes chosen by participants as very 
important to define moral identity in the context family, work/school and community, SD = standard deviation of percentage score, r = 
correlation of percentage score with age, (p) = two-tailed significance level of correlation based on full sample (N = 252). 
a Value domain as originally proposed by Schwartz (1992). The differentiation between self-direction-thought and self-direction-action 
as proposed by Schwartz et al. (2012) was not applicable in the context of the present study. 
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Table 3 
Results of Regression Analyses Predicting Mean-level and Cross-context Differentiation of Moral Identity by Age, Personality Traits 
and Social Desirability Response Bias 
 
   
Moral Identity: Mean-Level 
 Moral Identity:  
Cross-Context Differentiation 
  Step 1 Step 2  Step 1 Step 2 
  β t β t  β t β t 
Age (linear)   .23    3.73**  .13   2.13*   -.12   -2.37*  -.11    -2.19* 
Age (square root)  - - - -    .20   1.98*   .19     1.84 
Agreeableness     .20   3.05**     -.04    -0.61 
Conscientiousness     .12   1.66      .07 0.99 
Neuroticism    -.08  -1.16      .05     0.69 
Social desirability     .09   1.42     -.02    -0.31 
ΔR2  .054** .113**  .032* .006 
Note. N = 252 **p < .01, *p < .05.     
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Table 4 













 β t  β t  β t  β t  β t 
Age (linear)   .11     1.53    .17     2.63**    .14    2.08*    -.10  -1.67   -.11   -1.67 
Agreeableness   .08     1.21  -.22   -3.35**   -.07    -0.97     .23   3.45**   -.18   -2.71** 
Conscientiousness   .10     1.39  -.01   -0.15    .18     2.45*   -.27  -.381**    .14   1.91 
Neuroticism  -.01    -0.15  -.14   -1.92    .14     1.91    -.02   -0.32   .09   1.23 
Social desirability  .11    1.45   .00    0.02   .06     0.78    -.07   -1.02   .06  0.82 
R2 .045*  .088**  .057*  .12**  .065** 









Hypothetical Examples of High (Top) Versus Low (Bottom) Cross-context Differentiation 











































Not important to me 
F: has integrity 
W: has integrity 





























15! 25! 35! 45 55 65
Age in years 
0.4 
0.3 
0.1 
0.2 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.4 
-0.3 
0 
C
ro
ss
-C
on
te
xt
 D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
(z
) 
